


# RISK PREMIUM INVEST

## Daily analysis of the US Treasuries Market

19 September 2023

	Fed Funds	3-month (Tbills)	1-year	2-year	5-year	10-year
Rates	5.33	5.55	5.46	5.10	4.52	4.37
Daily changes (bp)	0	0	2	4	6	5



Source: Federal Reserve, H15. (with small tweaks to smooth out the impact of benchmarks changes).

### Highlights:

- US Treasury yields rose slightly on Tuesday.
- More and more investors have come to the conclusion that, without raising rates, the Fed would adopt a hawkish bias on Wednesday. Response at 2:00 p.m. with the release of the Summary of Economic Projections...

PART I : Changes in expected Fed Funds.

PART II : Risk premia contributions.


PART III : Methodological annex.

## PART I : CHANGES IN EXPECTED FED FUNDS


Fed funds futures provide a biased estimate of investors' true expectations, as they are influenced by varying risk premia. The Fed Funds rates expected by investors are here estimated by our proprietary model using both different surveys (the monthly "Consensus Economics" survey and the quarterly "Survey of Professional Forecasters") and the rich information contained in the yield curve (see the methodological annex). Estimates are revised when more recent surveys become available (on September 18, the September "Consensus Forecast" was introduced).

With no obvious trigger, expectations for future Fed funds rates at medium term horizons rose slightly on Tuesday. Investors have fine-tuned their expectations for the outcome of Wednesday's FOMC and more and more investors have come to the conclusion that, without raising rates, the Fed would adopt a hawkish bias in the Summary of Economic Projections.

	Current	Expected in three months	Expected in six months	Expected in one year	Expected in three years	Expected equilibrium
<b>Fed Funds</b>	5.33	5.43	5.41	4.89	3.39	3.03
<b>Daily changes (bp)</b>	0	-1	0	4	5	2



At 5.41% in six months, the expected Fed funds rates give a small probability to a final rate hike toward the end of the year. Investors will carefully examine the Fed's dot plots to determine the current proportion of FOMC voters who appear to support such further tightening of monetary policy. Also, close attention will be given to the expected movement in federal funds rates in 2024. Additionally, there is a question mark over what long-term "neutral rate" Fed officials will choose to display. Since June 2019, the median expectation has been stuck at 2.5%. According to our estimates, investors facing a very resilient economy have gradually become more pessimistic and have raised their average estimates from 2% at the start of 2022 to around 3% currently. It will be interesting to see whether some FOMC members consider that now is the time to start raising their own estimates.



### Main market-moving news: 19 September 2023

#### US Macroeconomics

Housing starts number for Aug at 1.283 mln (Expected 1.440 mln; Prior 1.452 mln revised at 1.447 mln).

Building permits number for Aug at 1.543 mln (Expected 1.443 mln; Prior 1.443 mln).

#### Others


## PART II : RISK PREMIA ANALYSIS

For US Treasuries, as for all financial assets, there are two key different types of risk premia:



- The short-term **tactical risk premia**: How much excess returns investors require to hold various risky assets at their tactical horizon (which depends on investors, but is often around 3 months)? The tactical positions taken by investors relative to their benchmarks (“neutral”, “short”, “long”) depend on these tactical risk premia.
- The **“buy-and-hold” or “embedded” risk premia**. How much excess return **long-term investors** expect if they hold risky assets over an extended horizon? In the case of US Treasuries, the buy-and-hold risk premia are the differences between the zero-coupon rates of various maturities and the (annualized) expected return on a fund invested in Fed Funds over the same period.

We estimate both types of risk premia (see the methodological annex and our excel file) but we discuss here only the buy-and-hold risk premia.

As is generally the case, higher expected Fed funds rates were accompanied by a slight increase in risk premia on US Treasuries.



	2-year	5-year	10-year
<b>Buy-and-hold risk premia</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.83</b>
<b>Daily changes (bp)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>



With a long-term perspective, it appears that the buy-and-hold risk premia on long-term Treasuries are quite high (see the right-hand side graph). This may not come as a surprise with some inflationary risks remaining and often – but not always - a positive correlation between the price of long-term bonds and equities. Yet, since the beginning of Fed’s Quantitative Easing in 2010 and until 2022, there has been only two episodes where the buy-and-hold risk premia on 10-year US Treasuries have been significantly positive: the 2013 “taper tantrum” and the 2021 “reflation trade” episodes where investors introduced large short positions in Treasuries. Both time, these relatively high short positions and positive risk premia proved unsustainable and risk premia came back later on negative territory.

Looking forward, changing buy-and-hold risk premia should introduce a lot of volatility in the US Treasuries markets. On the one hand, there is still an excess demand for long-term Treasuries and, we believe, a tendency for risk premia to go back on negative territory as soon as inflationary risks recede (and negative betas come back!). On the other hand, the market will have in the future to absorb a larger supply with a large deficit to finance and the Fed cutting its holding of bonds (“Quantitative Tightening”). This may push many investors to introduce again large short positions in the belief that long-term rates are now on a structural upward trend.

## PART III : METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

There is an abundant academic literature trying to extract from the yield curve the monetary policy path expected by investors and the risk premia embedded in the observed US Treasuries rates.


One of the best-known statistical models is the model developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New-York. Their estimates are published daily on the NY Fed website (see [www.newyorkfed.org/research/data\\_indicators/term-premia-tabs#/overview](http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/data_indicators/term-premia-tabs#/overview)). Strangely enough, these estimates don't seem to be used by many markets practitioners when they discuss the shape of the yield curve and how it can be explained by short-rates expectations and risk premia. One of the reasons is that the results of the model are often quite unrealistic. To illustrate that observation, we can compare the average short rates expected by investors over the next 10 years according to this model with what professional forecasters expect (answers, once a year in February, to the well-regarded survey managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. See [www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/real-time-data-research/survey-of-professional-forecasters](http://www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/real-time-data-research/survey-of-professional-forecasters)).



There are many reasons why the average investor's view priced into the market may differ somewhat from the answer given by professional forecasters, but the difference is often much too large to be realistic.

The truth is that the estimates published on the NY Fed website are rather imprecise. There is indeed a large academic literature stressing that the yield curve alone does not contain enough information to extract the investors' underlying views and that the results of surveys should be incorporated in the extraction process (see Kim, Don H., and Athanasios Orphanides, 2012, Term structure estimation with survey data on interest rate forecasts, *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 47).

Our model belongs to this class of models that combine information coming from well-regarded surveys with the observed yield curve. But its key originality is elsewhere. Our model does not extract only the buy-and-hold risk premia, but it also extracts the important short-term tactical risk premia required by investors on bonds of various maturities. These tactical risk premia are very important to understand the shape of the yield curve (see the references at the end of this page). One very important result of our work is that until the recent inflationary fears these tactical risk premia have been on average negative since the end 90s (the following graph represents the annualized excess return expected by investors on 10-year Treasuries at the 3-month horizon).



That means that a long time before the Fed introduced QE there was already an insufficient supply of risk-free Treasuries: tactical positions were on average structurally short in this key market. To keep it simple, this rich information about tactical risk premia is not discussed in this daily comment, but an excel file with the full information is available on our website (see the link on the homepage of [www.riskpremium.com](http://www.riskpremium.com))

**To know more about our modelling of the yield curve, and the key insights it provides on how markets price risks:**

For a short presentation of the indicators we publish and how they can be used to understand the US yield curve, see <https://riskpremium.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/RiskPremia-UST-guide-en.pdf>

For a non-academic description of our modelling, see <https://riskpremium.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/USTreasuries-Model-Guide.pdf>