


RISK PREMIUM INVEST

Daily analysis of the US Treasuries Market

7 September 2023

| | Fed Funds | 3-month (Tbills) | 1-year | 2-year | 5-year | 10-year |
|--------------------|-----------|------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Rates | 5.33 | 5.57 | 5.40 | 4.97 | 4.39 | 4.27 |
| Daily changes (bp) | 0 | 0 | -2 | -7 | -6 | -3 |



Source: Federal Reserve, H15. (with small tweaks to smooth out the impact of benchmarks changes).

Highlights:

- US Treasury yields fell slightly on Thursday.
- Expectations for future Fed funds rates fell slightly despite lower than expected initial jobless claims.

PART I : Changes in expected Fed Funds.

PART II : Risk premia contributions.


PART III : Methodological annex.

PART I : CHANGES IN EXPECTED FED FUNDS


Fed funds futures provide a biased estimate of investors' true expectations, as they are influenced by varying risk premia. The Fed Funds rates expected by investors are here estimated by our proprietary model using both different surveys (the monthly "Consensus Economics" survey and the quarterly "Survey of Professional Forecasters") and the rich information contained in the yield curve (see the methodological annex). Estimates are revised when more recent surveys become available (on August 11, the August "Consensus Forecast" and the third quarter "Survey of Professional Forecasters" were introduced).

Lower-than-expected initial jobless claims had a brief impact on the market, but the increase in rates was short-lived. At the end of the day, expectations for future Fed funds rates remained broadly stable at short-term horizons and declined slightly at medium term horizons. The reasons were not very clear. Maybe some analysts thought the initial jobless claims were distorted by Labor Day. More likely, the surprise on the jobs front was not enough to offset the growing sense of a slowdown in the global economy, encouraged on Thursday by a significant downward revision of eurozone GDP in the second quarter.

| | Current | Expected in three months | Expected in six months | Expected in one year | Expected in three years | Expected equilibrium |
|---------------------------|---------|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Fed Funds | 5.33 | 5.48 | 5.47 | 4.84 | 3.30 | 2.97 |
| Daily changes (bp) | 0 | 1 | 2 | -2 | -7 | -2 |



At 5.47% in six months and 4.84% in one year, expectations for future Fed funds rates are close to the Fed's most recent forward guidance. Investors still attribute some probability to a final rate hike towards the end of the year, as in the Fed's dot plots. These expectations are likely to remain quite volatile over the coming months as new information is released on inflation and the strength of the economy. An interesting point in the material released by the Fed at the end of the June meeting is that FOMC members appear to be at odds over the extent of likely rate cuts in 2024. The median estimate for Fed funds rates at the end of 2024 is 4.6%, but there is a wide range of opinions between 3.6% and 5.9%.



Main market-moving news: 7 September 2023

US Macroeconomics

Initial jobless claims at 216,000 (Expected 234,000; Prior 228,000 revised at 229,000).

Others

Euro zone Q2 GDP revised significantly downwards at +0.1% QoQ from +0.3% QoQ.


PART II : RISK PREMIA ANALYSIS

For US Treasuries, as for all financial assets, there are two key different types of risk premia:



- The short-term **tactical risk premia**: How much excess returns investors require to hold various risky assets at their tactical horizon (which depends on investors, but is often around 3 months)? The tactical positions taken by investors relative to their benchmarks (“neutral”, “short”, “long”) depend on these tactical risk premia.
- The **“buy-and-hold” or “embedded” risk premia**. How much excess return **long-term investors** expect if they hold risky assets over an extended horizon? In the case of US Treasuries, the buy-and-hold risk premia are the differences between the zero-coupon rates of various maturities and the (annualized) expected return on a fund invested in Fed Funds over the same period.

We estimate both types of risk premia (see the methodological annex and our excel file) but we discuss here only the buy-and-hold risk premia.

Not only was the decline in U.S. Treasury yields amid lower-than-expected initial jobless claims surprising, but the relative changes, especially pronounced for two-year rates, were also atypical. On Thursday, the market was not clearly responding to news, but engaged in a sort of slight repricing of the yield curve. According to our estimates, risk premia on US Treasuries declined slightly at the short end of the yield curve and increased slightly at the long end.



| | 2-year | 5-year | 10-year |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Buy-and-hold risk premia | 0.06 | 0.46 | 0.81 |
| Daily changes (bp) | -3 | -1 | 2 |



With a long-term perspective, it appears that the buy-and-hold risk premia on long-term Treasuries are quite high (see the right-hand side graph). This may not come as a surprise with some inflationary risks remaining and often – but not always - a positive correlation between the price of long-term bonds and equities. Yet, since the beginning of Fed’s Quantitative Easing in 2010 and until 2022, there has been only two episodes where the buy-and-hold risk premia on 10-year US Treasuries have been significantly positive: the 2013 “taper tantrum” and the 2021 “reflation trade” episodes where investors introduced large short positions in Treasuries. Both time, these relatively high short positions and positive risk premia proved unsustainable and risk premia came back later on negative territory.

Looking forward, changing buy-and-hold risk premia should introduce a lot of volatility in the US Treasuries markets. On the one hand, there is still an excess demand for long-term Treasuries and, we believe, a tendency for risk premia to go back on negative territory as soon as inflationary risks recede (and negative betas come back!). On the other hand, the market will have in the future to absorb a larger supply with a large deficit to finance and the Fed cutting its holding of bonds (“Quantitative Tightening”). This may push many investors to introduce again large short positions in the belief that long-term rates are now on a structural upward trend.

PART III : METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

There is an abundant academic literature trying to extract from the yield curve the monetary policy path expected by investors and the risk premia embedded in the observed US Treasuries rates.


One of the best-known statistical models is the model developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New-York. Their estimates are published daily on the NY Fed website (see www.newyorkfed.org/research/data_indicators/term-premia-tabs#/overview). Strangely enough, these estimates don't seem to be used by many markets practitioners when they discuss the shape of the yield curve and how it can be explained by short-rates expectations and risk premia. One of the reasons is that the results of the model are often quite unrealistic. To illustrate that observation, we can compare the average short rates expected by investors over the next 10 years according to this model with what professional forecasters expect (answers, once a year in February, to the well-regarded survey managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. See www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/real-time-data-research/survey-of-professional-forecasters).



There are many reasons why the average investor's view priced into the market may differ somewhat from the answer given by professional forecasters, but the difference is often much too large to be realistic.

The truth is that the estimates published on the NY Fed website are rather imprecise. There is indeed a large academic literature stressing that the yield curve alone does not contain enough information to extract the investors' underlying views and that the results of surveys should be incorporated in the extraction process (see Kim, Don H., and Athanasios Orphanides, 2012, Term structure estimation with survey data on interest rate forecasts, *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 47).

Our model belongs to this class of models that combine information coming from well-regarded surveys with the observed yield curve. But its key originality is elsewhere. Our model does not extract only the buy-and-hold risk premia, but it also extracts the important short-term tactical risk premia required by investors on bonds of various maturities. These tactical risk premia are very important to understand the shape of the yield curve (see the references at the end of this page). One very important result of our work is that until the recent inflationary fears these tactical risk premia have been on average negative since the end 90s (the following graph represents the annualized excess return expected by investors on 10-year Treasuries at the 3-month horizon).



That means that a long time before the Fed introduced QE there was already an insufficient supply of risk-free Treasuries: tactical positions were on average structurally short in this key market. To keep it simple, this rich information about tactical risk premia is not discussed in this daily comment, but an excel file with the full information is available on our website (see the link on the homepage of www.riskpremium.com)

To know more about our modelling of the yield curve, and the key insights it provides on how markets price risks:

For a short presentation of the indicators we publish and how they can be used to understand the US yield curve, see <https://riskpremium.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/RiskPremia-UST-guide-en.pdf>

For a non-academic description of our modelling, see <https://riskpremium.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/USTreasuries-Model-Guide.pdf>